**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police’s (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building.

Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate deficiencies with the Department’s Hazardous Incident Response Division (HIRD) and Canine Unit (K-9 or Unit). Deficiencies included a lack of adequate Department guidance for both HIRD and K-9.

HIRD contributed greatly toward the Department’s mission on January 6, 2021, through rendering safe multiple hazardous devices and the sweep of the Capitol complex with partner agencies. However, coordination concerning events between HIRD and the Department’s operational leadership was flawed, which resulted in misinformation among officers. Additionally, the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) lacked the necessary personnel and equipment to successfully complete its mission. The Department’s lockdown procedures would be improved by adopting best practices with multiple threats involving hazardous devices. Lastly, the Department does not have adequate, updated guidance in place for its Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) and HIRD. The lack of adequate and up-to-date policies and procedures for HIRD and ALERT creates ambiguity and lack of accountability and coordination.

The Department did not always comply with guidance related to K-9 operations or training and did not always ensure K-9 policies and procedures were up to date. A lack of K-9 related training or operational experience required for officials and formal guidance for emergency procedures, as well as inadequate hazardous device response guidance could have hampered the efficiency of the K-9 Unit on January 6, 2021. Without appropriate compliance with, or up-to-date K-9 policies and procedures, the Department could not ensure all K-9 officers were properly trained and up to date on equipment and procedures necessary to perform their duties. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

This is the sixth in a series of flash reports OIG is producing as part of the ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to these areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on the Department’s Dignitary Protection Division and Human Capital.

**Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police require that the Hazardous Incident Response Division communicate pertinent event staging information to responsible parties at least 1 day in advance.**

**Recommendation 2: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police prioritize staffing the Hazardous Materials Response Team.**

**Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately develop procedures designed to track and ensure that employees involved with incident management receive the training prescribed in Directive 1052.003, *Incident Command System*, dated October 16, 2018.**

**Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop procedures for searching for suspicious items campus-wide and include perimeter searches once a hazardous device has been confirmed.**

**Recommendation 5: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop lockdown procedures that account for factors such as multiple hazardous devices.**

**Recommendation 6: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop lockdown procedures for all posts on the Capitol Campus.**

**Recommendation 7: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update standard operating procedure OS-210-01, *Recall Procedures*, dated August 15, 2016, and Directive 1056.004, *Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT),* dated April 9, 2019, to reflect current practices.**

**Recommendation 8: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish policies that outline the specific training requirements for the Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team, Hazardous Devices Section, and Hazardous Materials Response Team.**

**Recommendation 9: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police require Canine [K-9] Unit officials that do not have previous canine training or experience to audit its in-house Basic Explosive Detection Course or develop** **an explosive detection course for supervisors.**

**Recommendation 10: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Directive 1056.002, *Response, Command, and Control of 10-100 NBC or Hazardous Materials Incident*, dated May 15, 2020, to explicitly require the Command Center to evaluate additional search areas for undetected devices.**

**Recommendation 11: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish a written standard operating procedure formalizing emergency procedures for the Canine [K-9] Unit.**

**Recommendation 12: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce the requirement for Canine [K-9] officers as detailed in the following standard operating procedures: OS-130-11, *Use of Personal Radiation Pagers for K-9 Technicians*, dated February 12, 2020; OS-130-03, *K-9 ATLAS Activations*, dated December 1, 2020; OS-130-17, *Standards for Explosive Ordinance Detection (EOD) K-9 Team Certification (RESTRICTED),* dated November 5, 2020.**

**Recommendation 13: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that Canine [K-9] officers receive the required 16 hours of monthly maintenance training as identified in standard operating procedures OS-130-17, *Standards for Explosive Ordinance Detection (EOD) K-9 Team Certification (RESTRICTED),* dated November 5, 2020, and OS-130-16, *Standards for Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) Detection K-9 Team Certification and Monthly Re-Training*, dated October 6, 2020.**

**Recommendation 14: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police increase the number of trainers to reduce the Canine [K-9] Technician to K-9 Trainer ratio in order to increase training to meet the monthly requirement.**

**Recommendation 15: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update standard operating procedure OS-130-17, *Standards for Explosive Ordinance Detection (EOD) K-9 Team Certification (RESTRICTED)*, dated November 5, 2020.**